Moving Matter Machine

Cyril C. House
Philosophy of Mind
14/02/2016

Moving Matter Machine

Introduction

  Are you free? Is freedom an actual, or even potential, attribute of the human experience? I think, in many contexts, most of us are free: freedom from slavery for example. In other contexts however, freedom becomes a much more uncertain claim, such as freedom from the conditions of one’s upbringing. Then so too are there such uncertain claims as are freedom of the will, or more precisely: the availability of multiple potentials in choice situations. I place an emphasis upon the word choice due to the fact that if freedom of the will is an illusion then so too would the appearance of ‘choice situations’ be an illusion the same.  In this essay I shall briefly explore the concept of freedom of the will, and detail why it is I have come to believe that we all are, in such a context, truly free.

Framework

  Benjamin Libet performed a series of experiments in the early 1980’s which were, by many, interpreted to disprove free will in action. It was thought by most at this time that to perform a voluntary action, one must first will the action so. The willing of the action would set off a causal chain of events which moved throughout the body to result in the predetermined action. Now back in 1964, Kornhuber and Deecke, a pair of German scientists, performed an experiment which showed there to be an increase of electrical activity in the brains of subjects just before they would perform some action (Information Philosopher). The discovery of Kornhuber and Deecke, in addition to some prodding by John Eccles (Information Philosopher), led Libet to begin running experiments to examine where it was free will fit into all of this. Libet subsequently placed subjects in front of a rapid-spinning clock and asked them to decide to flex their right finger at random; they should note where the clock was when they willed the action so, and again note the clock when the action was in-performance. Meanwhile Libet was scanning for and measuring their neural activity, in expectation of this electrical activity discovered by Kornhuber and Deecke. What he discovered is that the conscious willing of the action fell at such a time that electrical activity was already taking place in the brain. This meant that the ‘will’ could not possibly be causing the electrical activity, and if the electrical activity caused the movement or the action, without being preceded by a conscious willing of such an action, then we must be misunderstanding something about how the willing of an action takes place. A position has been suggested which seems to sweep the conflict under the rug, what is Epiphenomenalism, the belief that the Mind, and so therefore too the Will, are phenomena which are the result of brain activity; such as the ‘exhaust fumes’ of the brain (Clarke)(Clark). However I cannot agree with such a claim, for I believe the Mind and Will to be of too paramount-centrality within the lives of us all, to possibly be a non-causal-by-product of some much less interesting system within us.

  When you think about the provided information, what conclusion is it you come to? Do you agree with the apparent science of the matter? Or do you feel there must be something which the scientists are missing when discussing this topic? I am of the latter opinion, I see several flimsy parts involved in this experiment and they are flimsy regardless of the interpretation one takes away from the data presented. The first inaccuracy I find is the method of qualification of a Willing Experience. Humans are likely one of the most fallible sources of information there is, even if they do not intend to be mistaken they often are due to the plain fact that there remains a universal disjunction between the incoming communication concerning a matter and the degree of comprehension of that matter. Much can be done to mend such a divide in any given circumstance, yet nonetheless there will never be a perfectly accurate representation of understanding gleaned from a source of outside communication. After exercising myself in a home trial of the Libet Experiment, I become most concerned with specifically which portioned-progression of the act of willing one is to call ‘the moment of the willing’. Is it to be the portion of the willing when I begin to consider that ‘anytime now’ ought to be random enough and therefore I ought to act? Or perhaps the portion of the willing after I have decided precisely on the moment in which the act shall occur? Or ought it to be the portion of the willing as the will is transferring and coming to embody the physical convulsions appropriate for motion? My point is that such an indeterminate discrepancy cannot possibly yield determinate data.

  The second inaccuracy is to be found again in the methods of the experiment: the subjects were instructed to move the right finger at a random time; therefore they had already compiled the decision and stored it away for later use by the time they were being examined. One could argue that there is little to no ‘willing’ involved in a predetermined action. Therefore the willing of the action is sitting in the chamber of the mind, and so the readiness potential to perform the predetermined action could in no way predate its willing of. Now Libet had similar considerations upon reviewing his own data, and tentatively concluding that the brain initiated action before the subject seemed to will it so. ‘Well if the will does not initiate action’ Libet must have thought, ‘then perhaps it can inhibit action’. He placed a new spin on his experiment: the subject were to now will the flexing of their finger, but before the action manifested itself they were to suppress their original intention and veto the physical movement. What was discovered is that the subjects were, in fact, able to suppress the transition of electrical activity into motor function. These series’ of experiments by Libet and his colleagues remains in the conversation of today as it has come to fuel a spectacular degree of contemporary research into the nature of agency and authorship of action.

Exploration

  Thomas Hobbes said “[t]hat when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, it is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it” (4). The nature of the Universe and its constituent parts seems arguably to be matter in motion (Hobbes). The zenith of the known cosmos inevitably stretches away from wherever it may have begun, planets circle their stars, and electrons orbit their nucleuses. So too do human babies crawl around, human adults drive to and fro, and human species migrate. It seems foolish to consider that something could ever not be moving, for should a man so cease to walk then so forth shall he be carried by the rotation of the globe; and should the globe so cease to spin, then so forth shall it be carried by the elaboration of the cosmos; and should the cosmos cease to grow, then still would the atoms spin within it. What then, I ask, what then is the justification for the consideration that human agents ought to hold some form of control over whether they move forth with the rest of known existence? Whether or not they ‘will’ it to be so. I say no, I say that human beings and human consciousness is dragged forth within the inevitable grind of its world, for most would lack the motivation to will themselves about each day, were this not the case. However this need not imply some style of absolutely deterministic existence, for there is still the phenomenon of Free Won’t displayed by Libet’s second string of experimentation. For should my life be as though I am careening downwards on the face of some unending hill, the air rushing by as my experience, then still do I possess the power of inhibition: I dig my right foot in and I veer to the right, I dig my left foot in and I veer to the left, I dig both feet in and the air rushes by slightly slower. This is the power of Free Won’t, and it is in fact an even greater power than Free Will. Should Free Will be the case, then I need always put out in order to gain reciprocal experience, and this seems to be a highly inefficient strategy; however should Free Won’t be the case, then I need not exert any effort to receive reciprocal experience because it is forced into me by my sheer forward velocity, but should I be receiving experience which I do not agree with, then I am able to exert my efforts to alter my path down the great hill, and with my efforts arrive new opportunities of experience from the other side of the street.

Conclusion

  In attempting to come to a closer understanding of the nature and plausibility of free will of action we have briefly reviewed the work of Kornhuber & Deecke, which led us into a discussion of some of the works of Benjamin Libet. After reviewing his original experiement I took the time to address two of my major concerns with his methodology, and in discussing the implications of such methodological flaws we arrived at Libet’s second-string of experimentation which was the testing of the suppressive capabilities of the will. After concluding that there seems to be such a capability, or faculty rather, as Free Won’t, I turned to argue from my own perceptions that Free Will seems to imply that one could fail to will some sequence of things and so therefore too fail to be ‘in motion’, which would be incompatible with the most basic observations of the Universe. After my expository comment on the aforementioned observations of the Universe I concluded in congruence with Libet’s second experiment that Free Won’t seems the most plausible case. Now, in accordance with my opening statements I conclude that Free Won’t is in fact the perfect freedom, for with it one is free to ‘not will’ without the concern of becoming static matter, to speak metonymically. Yet so too are we free to will the cessation or alteration of actions and procedures initiated by our unconscious brains, a faculty what is known as Free Won’t.

Works Cited

Clark, Andy. “Appendix II”. Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press: New York, 2014. Print.

Clarke, Peter G.H. “The Libet Experiment and its Implications for Conscious Will”. Be Thinking. 15/05/2014. 28/03/2016. Web. URL = http://www.bethinking.org/human-life/the-libet-experiment-and-its-implications-for-conscious-will

Hobbes, Thomas. “Leviathan: Or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil”. Everyman’s Library: Great Britain, 1965. Print.

Hobbes, Thomas. “Of Imagination”. Leviathan: Or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. Everyman’s Library: Great Britain, 1965. 04 – 08. Print.

Libet Experiments. Information Philosopher. 27/03/2016. Web. URL = http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libet_experiments.html