Philosophy of Mind
Secondary Considerations
Most religions today, as well as most spiritualist doctrines, hold the belief (or something akin to) that life goes on after death. Some believe that the dead are shipped off to live in a remote plane of existence, while others believe that individuals are ‘reborn’ in new bodies/forms. Although similar to one another in many respects, each belief system is unique. However, there is at least a single, assured, thread which runs through all belief systems of this type. That thread is the notion that there is something else, something which is not the physical body, and which is the thing what is teleported, or transported, to somewhere else, upon receipt of the death of the physical body. The Soul, The Spirit- this thing is referenced by these names, and others. However, for the moderate degree of consensus that there is some thing, it is decidedly less agreed upon precisely what that thing is. This is because the thing of which I/they speak is immaterial. That is to say it is not discernible by physical experimentation or observation, and we know of no method(s) for testing/observing for nonphysical/immaterial phenomena. Why then do so many believe in that which they can neither detect, nor even sufficiently describe? Let us then look into the matter at hand. Following I shall summarise the key points of the substance dualism debate, and attempt to explain precisely why substance dualism is an outdated, and incorrect assumption/theory.
Substance Dualists have many strong arguments, among them is the notion that mental states/objects can perform actions which physical states/objects cannot. For example I, a physical person, can hypothesize about the concluding sentences of this paper, and I am able to draw relatively accurate portrayals of both the literal words which will be used, as well as the (less tangible) impact which they shall have on the reader. The egg cartons tacked to my wall cannot hypothesize about anything, they can neither hypothesize about the physical words which I shall write in my conclusion, nor can they hypothesize about the intangible impact which my words shall have. Why can they not? Simple, say Substance Dualists, they cannot hypothesize because they are lacking the required mental supervenience which performs abstract functions such as hypothesization. To combat this claim you may tell them that computers are things which can ‘hypothesize’ about future states of things if they are so encoded. Yet they would say back to you that such an account of hypothesization is entirely incomplete and therefore is not hypothesization at all. It is an incomplete account because although it can predict the tangible, (the future states of a certain spreadsheet for example) it cannot predict, nor does it even acknowledge that there is such a thing as, the intangible associations inextricably linked to the physical result. Herein the Substance Dualist holds a very strong position indeed, but aside from this (and perhaps a few other) argument(s) the Substance Dualist is indeed urinating in the direction of an oncoming tempest, as I shall explain hereafter.
Now I wish to draw your attention to a statement I made in the introductory paragraph: “we know of no method(s) for testing/observing for nonphysical/immaterial phenomena”. What this statement, or fact rather, implies is that we have no way to check if or if not there is such a thing as an immaterial substance. This being the case, it follows that we have no way to run experiments on an immaterial substance. This being the case, it follows that we cannot explain anything about this substance. This is a problem because of the Theory of Causation: all things which are have a sufficient and complete explanation for how they came to be. So to perform a G.E. Moore Shift on the antecedent information will result in an argument as such:
1. All things which are have a sufficient and complete explanation for how they came to be
2. We have no way to test for the existence of an immaterial substance
Therefore
3. We cannot explain how an immaterial substance came to be
Therefore
4. An immaterial substance is not.
Now, the resolute substance dualist will point out that simply because we have not discovered the explanation yet, does not mean that the explanation is not there. For thousands of years mankind knew nothing about microbiology, yet that did not deter Leeuwenhoek from discovering it (Boundless). But there is a flaw with this argument in the case of Substance Dualism.
The case of Leeuwenhoek and the discovery of microbiology is a valid argument because before the discovery was made there was an aspect of the world (Ex. disease, rotting food, foul breath) which could not be completely and sufficiently explained. There were of course rudimentary explanations such as a failure to sacrifice enough goats in order to appease the gods; so then the gods would use their ‘magic’ and POOF: your breath smells as though you defecated in your own mouth. Even back then such an explanation was insufficient, mainly because of this word ‘magic’. What is magic? How does magic work? Such questions require an answer to be able to comprehend the word magic, and so therefore too such a comprehension of magic is necessary to a sufficient explanation of why grandpa’s breath is so foul. So again we have this fallacy in that we cannot explain magic so therefore magic is neither a thing nor an explanation for things. So here now we bleed into the claims of the substance dualist. Why can the case of microbiology not be the case for Substance Dualism? Why can we not posit ‘we just don’t know yet, and therefore we cannot say one way or the other’? The reason we cannot is because of the extant explanation of that which Substance Dualism attempts to elucidate.
If you ask a physiologist to describe what happens when [Grandpa] runs away from a lion, they will say something like this. Running occurs when certain muscle groups- especially muscles in the thigh- contract powerfully. The thigh muscles contract because they are stimulated by certain nerves. Those nerves arise in the spine, and are in turn stimulated by special spinal nerves. The spinal nerves in their turn are stimulated by the motor cortex- the part of the brain devoted to the initiation and control of movement (Ravenscroft).
Note that nothing being explained here has to do with immaterial substances. Note also that there is a complete and sufficient explanation of running. So too is there a complete and sufficient explanation for all things which have to do with both vital and voluntary motions; that is to say that motions of the blood, the breath, the excrement, the nutrition, as well as motions of the thought, the action, the pursuit, the avoidance et cetera, are all completely and sufficiently explained by physiology, and if not by physiology then by another hard science such as physics or biochemistry. Thusforth it follows that this thing what it is which Substance Dualism attempts to offer an explanation of, is in no need of an explanation for it has already been explained!
Furthermore, might the substance dualist claim, there is such a thing which has not been explained by science, and this this thing is called consciousness; this is a valid claim. There are many working theories of how consciousness comes to be, and exactly what the nature of consciousness is, but to date there is no sufficient and complete explanation of the nature of consciousness. Does this lend credence to the substance dualist’s argument? Unlikely at best. If I feel a slap on the right side of my face, and I turn around to see you standing there before turning back around; then I feel another slap on the right side of my face and turn around to see you standing there again, and again I turn back around; then I feel a slap on the left side of my face, is it realistic to turn around expecting to see my mother there? Certainly not.
So here we are, having now been briefed on the subject of Substance Dualism, a few of its strongest arguments, and reasons why these arguments are unfounded in the modern day world. In millennia past substance dualists had a highly legitimate theory for the explanation of certain things in their world. They now however, have been corrected by modern science. Substance dualists explained the way the world works in a pretty good way, but then physiology, biochemistry, kinesiology, and other hard sciences came along and explained the way the world works, not just pretty good, but precisely; completely and sufficiently. Maybe there is some sort of immaterial substance out amongst the world, but we cannot know anything about it, and therefore we cannot use it to explain things which we do know are out there. Science has unveiled ways to reveal the secrets of that which we do know to exist, and therefore to debate the matter of Substance Dualism is methodologically futile.
Works Cited
“History of Microbiology: Hooke, van Leeuwenhoek, and Cohn.” Boundless Microbiology. Boundless, 21 Jul. 2015. Retrieved 27 Jan. 2016 from https://www.boundless.com/microbiology/textbooks/boundless-microbiology-textbook/introduction-to-microbiology-1/introduction-to-microbiology-18/history-of-microbiology-hooke-van-leeuwenhoek-and-cohn-204-8020/
Ravenscroft, Ian. “Dualism”. Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford University Press, 2005. 09 – 24. Print.
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