Philosophy of Religion
29/10/2015
No Country for Incomprehensible Beings
Blaise Pascal and William Clifford find themselves as the two faces of a universal coin in the realm of religious faith: Pascal parallels the contemporary Evangelist worshipper, arguing that it is best to believe in God whether or not there is evidence of such a being because if there is then it will pay out in the end, and if there is not then one really does not lose much out of life in having believed. Clifford, meanwhile, parallels the contemporary Atheist, arguing that one ought not to believe anything without sufficient evidence for such belief. Each Philosopher’s arguments are strikingly compelling, and each are also composed in a potently concise manner, leaving few moving parts to be trifled with. This argument shall support Clifford however, in attempting to trifle with the logic Pascal has presented, and I am confident that it shall be done ably so.
Clifford offers an example of a ship setting out to sea; I will present a synonymous tale here which will be more suited to the culture of the present day world. NASA has discovered a new planet capable of sustaining life, we shall call this planet Phebos, and due to global warming they must ensure that a collection of breeding-age humans are shipped to Phebos as soon as possible. NASA gathers the ripest hundred humans from the world and puts them in the only space shuttle available at the moment: an 80’s era rocket. Upon hearing of NASA’s intentions the American Society of Aeronautic Engineers (ASAE) calls up NASA and tells them that they should not send these people into space in the rickety, old rocket because it will not make the journey to Phebos in one piece, and all the hundred ripest humans of the Earth will perish in the terrifying vacuum. NASA tells ASAE that they have heard the concern and will deliberate on the matter, this rocket is ready to go and has been out in space once before in the 80’s so why should it not be fit to do so again? Also there will be considerable cost and time involved in developing a new rocket especially for this purpose. NASA decides to send the people in the old rocket after having carefully weighed their options and deciding, whole-heartedly and as one, that the old rocket was ‘good enough’ to make the trip. On the predesignated day NASA launches the rocket up into the air, and watches as it crumples and explodes about 1000 miles above the launch pad. NASA sincerely believed that the rocket was good enough to make the journey. Clearly that did not exempt the rocket from failing and killing many people, but does their sincere belief exempt them from the guilt of those deaths? Belief absolutely does not exempt, or even diminish the guilt of NASA because “[they] had no right to believe on such evidence as was before [them]” (Clifford 104). You may object, saying that if the rocket makes it to Phebos safely then the beliefs of NASA are justified; and following this line of thought claim that justification of belief seems untethered to the outcome of a situation. Because their beliefs are either just or not just, and the rocket either makes it or does not make it, and they hold their beliefs prior to the event of the rocket’s making, or not making, it and therefore their beliefs must have been either just or unjust prior to the rocket’s departure; accordingly it would seem that the just-ness of their beliefs does not require the outcome of the situation before being decided and as such the two things are not tied to one another. In this way you might say that it was just of NASA to believe, regardless of the outcome, because true belief justifies itself inherently. But I say to you Objectors that the just-ness of a belief lies not in the content of the belief itself, but in the basis of that what is to be believed (Clifford 104). What one believes is meaningless, how one came about such beliefs is the true source of justification. Had NASA come about their belief by way of experimentation and testing, such would have been a just belief, but to have more or less indoctrinated oneself into belief by way of dismissing controversial evidence as ‘nothing to fret’ is not a proper way to come into believing.
Pascal defines God as “infinitely incomprehensible, since, having no parts nor limits, He has no [kinship] to us” (Pascal 100) and claims “[w]e are then incapable of knowing what He is or if He is” (Pascal 100); finally claiming that “it is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense” (Pascal 100), describing the belief of Christians and their inability to prove what they believe. This latter claim is both logical and nonsensical at once. It is logical in that if Christians were able to prove God exists it would have to be in human-comprehensible terms, and by Pascal’s very definition nothing about God is comprehensible to mankind. But Christians do not claim to be able to prove the existence of God, and therefore one may not utilize such an objection against them and their beliefs, this is why the claim is logical on one hand. On the other hand the claim is completely nonsensical because in lacking proofs there remains no justification for a belief in God. In fact simply by believing in a being or a force such as God is to claim some degree of comprehension of the concept ‘God’ and therefore defeats itself in that God is “infinitely incomprehensible” (Pascal). Pascal continues to marshal evidence against himself in his second of the three statements I have provided above. If we are incapable of knowing what or if God is then perhaps someone could tell me exactly what we are talking about here! I can clearly contrive what it is we are speaking of, as I am sure Pascal could. So if we are capable of knowing what He is, then we are not incapable of knowing what He is. Therefore God does not exist for the primary reason that I can comprehend what God is. Pascal uses his argument to claim that it is better to believe than to not believe, because if one believes and there is a God one is infinitely rewarded; if one believes and there is not a God one’s lose is minimal, a few Sundays a year spent in church; if one does not believe and there is a God one will suffer for eternity; if one believes and there is not a God then one gains little by doing so, a few Sundays a year spent free of church.
Pascal’s claims are literally about belief in God, but let us extrapolate them to just general belief, such as belief in the ability of an old, creaky rocket ship. Pascal’s arguments would support NASA’s belief in the ship because “it is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense” (Pascal), and may well be the case should we apply Pascal’s formula: if they believe and the ship makes it then humanity is saved; if they believe and the ship does not make it, then humanity is assuredly doomed. Since either Pascalian quadrant denoting disbelief will not yield an attempt of the ship to make it or not, there truly remains but one other option which is to not believe, in which case humanity encounters peril in the face of global warming whilst NASA attempts to build a new spaceship. But having evidence that the current ship is too old for use, is the 50/50 chance of the ship making the journey any different than the 50/50 chance that there will be time to build a new, and safe spaceship? Yes actually, there is a difference. We have already established that catastrophic global warming is absolutely imminent, so everybody on Earth is going to die no matter what. We have the ability to salvage our species by sending 100 of us out into space; the people whom we choose will not perish to global warming. So we have two potential parties, Earthers and Spacers; the Earthers are going to die with 100% certainty, the Spacers have a 50/50 chance of survival. Based on the evidence before them (NASA) that the only potentially surviving party may have less than an optimal chance of living out in space, it is morally obligatory that NASA take the time to build a new spacecraft and give the Spacers the best chance possible. The evidence is not always evident, but it is evident whether or not there is evidence to be had. Perhaps in another Universe there are laws of faith which make the most sense, but in this Universe, our Universe, the necessity of evidence is evidential.
Works Cited
Clifford, William. “The Ethics of Belief”. Philosophy of Religion 5th ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger. Oxford University Press: New York, 2014. 103- 107. Print.
Pascal, Blaise. “The Wager”. Philosophy of Religion 5th ed. Michael Peterson et al. Oxford University Press: New York, 2014. 100-101. Print.
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