A Brief Clarification of Existence

Cyril C. House
Philosophy
01/10/2016

A Brief Clarification Of Existence

       Life is change. Everything about and within life is constantly changing, as is life itself, and therefore ‘Life’ and ‘Change’ are dialectically interchangeable. I should hope that this information is not new to you, my reader. Perhaps something that is just as commonly known, although much less commonly realized in an attentive and conscious manner, is change of self. Biologically one’s self is constantly dying off: every cell of every fraction of the human body dies off to be replaced by fresher and more lively cells; and this happens regularly, constantly. Psychologically the same occurrence takes place: one goes about life with beliefs and values and as experiences occur in the life of one, the experiences influence one’s beliefs regarding their beliefs and values. Sometimes the beliefs and values hold true against contrary evidence, but more often they are slightly altered: modified to correspond with the new information and the supplementary evidence regarding ‘the way things are’. Biologically, it only takes a moderate amount of slight changes here and there along the way before the entirety of what the body now consists of becomes completely replaced. Psychologically an identical happenstance occurs: beliefs and values are modified bit by bit until eventually nothing of what the original set of beliefs and values was exists any longer. Rene Descartes aside, it is difficult to deny that a human being, a person if you will, consists of a mind and of a body and without one or the other the person ceases to be such. So the query now becomes: if the mind and the body are regularly replaced to an extent that they no longer consist of anything that they once were, then is that mind plus body combination still the same person?

       Perhaps that is too complex to fathom the possibilities of, at this point in time, but it would be more manageable if simplified. Consider this then:

In ancient Greece, there was a legendary king named Theseus who supposedly founded the city of Athens. Since he fought many naval battles, the people of Athens dedicated a memorial in his honor by preserving his ship in the port. This “ship of Theseus” stayed there for hundreds of years. As time went on, some of the wooden planks of Theseus’ ship started rotting away. To keep the ship nice and complete, the rotting planks were replaced with new planks made of the same material. Here is the key question: If you replace one of the planks, is it still the same ship of Theseus? . . . What happens if you change two of the ship’s planks? Would that make it somehow less of the original ship than after one plank is changed? What if the ship consists of a hundred planks and forty-nine of the planks are changed? How about fifty-one changed planks? What about changing ninety-nine of the hundred planks? Is the single plank at the bottom of the ship enough to maintain the original lofty status of the ship? And what if all of the planks are changed? If the change is gradual, does the ship still maintain its status as the ship of Theseus? How gradual must the change be? (Yanofksy, P1:P2)

Now imagine that the ship is our person in question: after having all of his or her ‘planks changed’ is the person still the same ‘ship’? Yes the changed person is the same person before and after the change regardless of how complete the changing process is, and regardless of whether or not the change is gradual or instantaneous. Many argue that to alter the original components of anything, whether few or many (and especially all), whether gradually or instantaneously, is to alter the identity of the thing as well. Let it here be demonstrated that these suppositions are in fact not defensible.

       It is the case that if my kidney fails and I must have a transplant of it, then after the transplant takes place: the kidney which was just someone else’s, now becomes mine. The fact that all the organs which surround the ‘new’ kidney are mine and therefore the kidney is assimilated into my identity; the kidney becomes my own. Likewise if one plank of Theseus’ ship is swapped out, the surrounding planks assimilate the fresh plank’s identity into their own and the fresh plank is now identified as a plank of Theseus’ ship. Furthermore, suppose that six months after my kidney transplant, my other kidney fails and I have another donor organ installed next to the first one. The exact same thing happens: it is assimilated into my identity by the identity of the surrounding organs, even the transplanted kidney next to it helps to assimilate it, as we have already determined that the other kidney has become an organ of mine. The same holds true for planks of a ship, and the same holds true for values and beliefs.

       I will now prove that if the ship of Theseus is entirely disassembled, the pieces carried to an adjacent harbour, and there reassembled, that it is the exact same ship as was disassembled. For this I ask you to imagine a Lego set which provides you with the pieces and the map to construct ‘Johnny the Stegosaurus’. You take the pieces out of the box and build Johnny, then your mum asks you to get ready for bed and so you smash Johnny apart and return him to his box. The following day at playtime you select the Lego set, remove the pieces and again build the Stegosaurus. Is this Stegosaurus still Johnny? Of course it is! It says right on the box: “Build Johnny the Stegosaurus with these Lego pieces”. How could the Stegosaurus be any other Stegosaurus than Johnny?

       As for instantaneous change the analogy is simple enough: consider yourself now; and consider yourself now; and again consider yourself now. Did you assume a different identity from the time I first asked to the third? If you did then you are either a devil’s advocate looking for an argument (which you will lose) or you admit that you hold the same identity of self from one moment to the next. Guess what though? Change is constant and there are no states which are in-between change. From one moment to the next you and any/everyone/thing else in existence becomes slightly different, even if the only change is that the person or thing is now a moment older than it was.  If anything about an entity changes, is it still the exact same entity? No it could not be, for we have already established that there are differences, regardless of how minute. Although things about your identity and self from one moment to the next remain consistent enough that you do not notice the change, you are in fact never the exact same person you are at any other moment. Identity itself however, holds true throughout these instantaneous changes of self. If it did not then ‘identity’ would be entirely insubstantial and hold no true merit in discourse or thought. It does however: I am aware of myself and others of me and that is known as identity. Identity exists and therefore identity exists in the face of change, even instantaneous change.

       I feel I have justly and adequately proved that should you take Theseus’ ship and do any one or any many things to it (Theseus’ ship), it will remain to be: Theseus’ ship. Oneself, likewise, may undergo massive and constant change, alteration, augmentation, dismemberment et cetera, and still have one’s identity remain constant. Identity is the one thing you will never lose and the one thing which can never be taken from you. Without identity nothing would exist, without identity this discourse could not be.

Works Cited

Yanofksy, Noson S. Utne Reader. Ogden Publications, Inc., November 2013. Web. 05/03/2015.                http://www.utne.com/mind-and-body/ship-of-theseus-identity-ze0z1311zjhar.aspx