Sunday, 10 January 2016

A Most Brutal Sport

Cyril C. House
Advanced Ethics
26/10/2015

A Most Brutal Sport

       Jus Ad Bellum, a justified waging of war; Jus in Bello, ethical battlefield conduct between warring states. Do you see the contradiction here in these terms? Before even understanding the specifics of what each means does it not feel awkward and alien to experience these terms beside each other? Justified, apparently, complementing the waging of war; and ethical, apparently, complementing the conduct of a battlefield. These terms do not complement one another and in fact do not make any sort of sense alongside each the other. Battle is the absolute degeneration of ethics, and so too war is the failure of justice. There are people who would attempt to ‘justify’ their conduct and their desires by professing to the masses that combat is ethical and war just but, to any mind not subdued by the proselytization of the fear-mongering tyranny of war-culture, this is plainly not possible. No combat is ever ethical nor war just because combat is an expression of hatred and of violence, and neither hatred nor violence can be contained. I may say to my enemy ‘I will respect you if we fight’, but within the heat of conflict, within the blind, fear-based actions of survival, there is no conscience and there are no morals, there is only that which stands between myself and the ability to continue living. Herein I shall examine the microcosms of militarism, that is combat, and with it extrapolate a claim to the macrocosms of militarism, that is war; no combat is ever ethical, and therefore no war is ever just.

       Primarily let us examine War-Culture’s conceptual analysis of ethical combat, so that we might better understand what it is they claim. The conditions of ‘ethical combat’ are quite broad, and here I have chosen a select few areas to work with which I believe are most prudent to the respect of human lives, which after all is what the ‘ethics of war’ are concerned with: the respect of individuals by individuals. According to the Crimes of War website, the code of conduct on a battlefield prohibits:

• The targeting of civilian populations for attack
• Biological weaponry (use and experimentation)
• Use of asphyxiating gases
• Incitement to genocide
• Abuse of the sick, the wounded, prisoners of war, and all other combatants otherwise rendered unable to fight. Those soldiers whom are ‘outside of the fight’ are known as hors de combat.

       Based on its economy, military, political influence, innovation, and culture; the United States remains the sole superpower of the present day (Bremmer) and is recognized as the world leader of democracy, a political system which values freedom and justice above all else. It is for this reason that I believe it appropriate to use them as a representation of the status quo of war in the current day, they are the most powerful nation on the globe and they ought to be a prime role model for all others, which seems to be supported when discovering that “[a]t the forefront of the United States’ foreign policy is the notion that America helps itself by helping others” (Kelly). Now please follow closely as I examine America’s ‘jus in bello’ since the end of World War Two, which is an effective measurement primarily because it was after the end of World War II that the amended Geneva Convention, prohibiting inhumane treatment of civilian populations and soldiers rendered incapable of continuing to fight, was added to the already present Hague Convention and Regulations of 1899 and 1907, dictating humane means of war such as the prohibition of asphyxiating gases and expanding bullets (Cornell) (ICRC). I also find this time frame appropriate because of the sobering effects of the World Wars on all peoples.

       The Second World War let out into the Cold War, during which tensions between the developed countries was extremely high. In 1950 there began a civil war in Korea. The United Nations, under the leadership of the United States, flew over to intervene on the side of the South Koreans; the same as China intervened on behalf of the North (Milestones). On July 26, 1950, a horde of Korean refugees were gathered at a stone bridge near the village of No Gun Ri. Under strict command by U.S. superiors: no movement of Koreans was to be permitted across the battlefield for any reason, and so the refugees continued to amass. Suddenly a Lieutenant was shouting “fire on everything, kill ‘em all[!]” (Williams), and some four hundred Korean civilians were mowed down by the 7th Cavalry infantrymen, and strafed by U.S. planes. A Korean survivor recalls “[t]he floor under the bridge was a mixture of gravel and sand. People clawed with their bare hands to make holes to hide in . . . Other people piled up the dead like a barricade, and hid behind the bodies as a shield against the bullets” (Williams). Eighteen years later, March 16, 1968, in the midst of the Vietnam War, U.S. forces entered the Vietnamese village of My Lai and “[b]y the end of the day, they had shot and killed between 300 and 507 unarmed and unresisting men, women and children, none of them apparently members of the enemy forces” (PBS).

       Two years after the Korean War is when the Vietnamese War began, and the Vietnamese strike and feint tactics were vastly superior to the American strategies at the time and the U.S. became increasingly desperate for a win within the thick, mountainous jungles. It was in pursuing this win that “millions of litres of defoliants such as Agent Orange were dropped on Vietnam” (Scott-Clark and Levy). American scientists claimed then, as they do still, that the defoliants which they dropped out of planes and into the jungles of ‘Nam were transitory chemicals which were not harmful to humans. Yet in 2003, nearly fifty years after the fact, “[t]here [were] an estimated 650,000 [afflicted victims] in Vietnam, suffering from an array of baffling chronic conditions. Another 500,000 [had] already died. The thread that weaves through all their case histories is defoliants deployed by the US military during the war. Some of the victims are veterans who were doused in these chemicals during the war, others are farmers who lived off land that was sprayed” (Scott-Clark and Levy). The Americans using chemical weapons in the Vietnamese jungles is by no means an isolated case, either in country using them or in war during which they have been used. The Americans ‘tested’ distilled mustard gas as well as a variety of nerve agents in Panama in the 1950’s (FOR). Even thirty years later, in the 1980’s, there was still popular and persistent use of poison gas and nerve agents by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War, the precursors of which were, ironically, sold to Iraq by various U.S. allies. Furthermore Iraq was supplied with strategic information relevant to the deployment of such weapons by the American Central Intelligence Agency (Dyer).

       Later in the same Iraq-Iran War, Saddam Hussein contracted Hassan Al Majid to ‘deal with the Kurds’ and by Decree No. 160 granted Majid unrestricted permissions to do whatever he felt was needed. Majid got straight to work, having Personal Directive No. 28/3650 signed off on. 28/3650 “declar[ed] a zone that contained over a thousand Kurdish villages to be a prohibited area, from which all human and animal life was to be eradicated. [‘]It is totally prohibited for any foodstuffs or persons or machinery to reach the villages that have been banned for security reasons,[‘] the directive stated. [‘]Concerning the harvest, it must be finished before 15 July and, after this year, farming will not be authorised in this region... The armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas[‘]” (Nezan). The Iraqi forces did this via chemical bombing, and did so with arms and funds from the Western countries, with equipment from France and Russia, and with technological upgrades from Germany (Nezan). “In August 1988 the United Nations Sub-Committee on Human Rights voted by 11 votes to 8 not to condemn Iraq for human rights violations” (Nezan). Among the 11 votes to not condemn Iraq for this heinous genocide, were Russia (then the USSR), France, and the United States. France and the U.S. were two of the signatory bodies upon the 1925 Geneva Convention which was put in place as a means of condemning the use of poisonous, asphyxiating or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Russia signed the same treaty three years later in 1928 (UNODA). So these three countries are some of the founding fathers of biological and chemical weapon prohibition, and they voted that Iraq should not be condemned for chemical genocide.

       Twenty years after the Iraq-Iran Conflict, the U.S. found itself invading Afghanistan. One of the victories was over an Iraqi prison called Abu Ghraib, where Saddam Hussein routinely held public executions and torture sessions with those which he held there, twenty miles west of Baghdad. The Americans captured the prison, reconstructed the entire facility, and began holding prisoners of their own there. In the summer of 2003 a major investigation into the happenings of the American-held Abu Ghraib was under way. Written testimonies, eye-witness testimonies, and a horde of photographic proof, all intimately detailing the torture of Iraqi prisoners being held there: physical, emotional, sexual, and religious torture. The most interesting thing is that the American torturers seemed to not understand that they were in the wrong, they are seen in photographs smiling and giving thumbs-up beside piles of bloodied, naked Iraqis with bags over their heads (Hersh).

       So we have now reviewed several conflicts which occurred under the ethical guidelines of both The Hague Convention and Regulations of 1899 and 1907, as well as the (amended) Geneva Convention of 1948, and what we find within this review is outright savagery. As established within two particular agreements, The Hague Convention and The Geneva Convention, both of which America has agreed to by the signing of, we discovered that ‘ethical combat’ is combat in which civilian populations are not a target, asphyxiating gases, and chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, arranging or supporting genocide is prohibited, and hors de combat are to be respected as such. Together we have grazed the surface of American militarism over the past fifty or so years, and within that menial cross-section of history we have come to understand that America, as well as other reputable nations, has committed atrocious acts during times of war, not once or twice but, over and over again. The guidelines of ethical combat are not being followed, nor are they being enforced. Why would a state (or many states for that matter) agree to certain regulations regarding their conduct, and then proceed to blatantly disregard those same regulations? If they had an issue with the ethics of such regulations then they could have not signed, or they could have motioned for an amendment before they did sign. Alas these states read the documents, agreed to their contents, and signed off saying they would conform to that which is outlined within. The obvious answer is that they did believe the regulations were in their best interest, and perhaps even believed that it was possible to follow them. But some rules are difficult to follow, no matter the intent and admitted conformity behind them. For example I may have a personal rule against kicking others’ genitals, I may view it as inhumane, unnecessary, and slightly barbaric to do so. However as Johnny and I are brawling and Johnny suddenly produces a lethal weapon from some concealed spot and bares down upon me with a wide stance: I am going to kick Johnny’s genitals. I am going to kick them as hard as I can, because if I do not then Johnny will kill me. I justify the misconduct to myself by thinking that in this particular case it was okay to abandon that belief and stoop down to such a savage level of play because of the situation I found myself in.

       Our current international struggles seem to provide a counter to my argument against the possibility of just war as we are faced with the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS is a regime committed to radical jihadist beliefs, and they are committing acts of terror against their enemies across the globe. Their enemies are not just soldiers of foreign militaries, and their enemies are not confined to the Middle Eastern countries, their enemies are every/anyone whom is not a radical jihadist; that means you and me and all the children of the world (all those whom are not their own children, presumably). ISIS has stated its intent to kill everyone whom it cannot convert, and their actions grow more aggressive every day, from public beheadings of ‘non-believers’ to coordinated, synchronous terror attacks throughout major international capitals. Surely it is ethical to kill these terrorists? Surely to stand up for ourselves in the face of such atrocities can be considered a just war? Absolutely not, no combat is ever ethical nor war ever just, for it is the nature of combat to be unethical; it is the nature of war to be unjust. When people are stricken with fear they will do unthinkable things, whether they are civilian or soldier, whether they are prisoner or guard, they will have fear for what is to come and they will do anything to escape that fear. One cannot control how one’s reptilian complex will respond to a fight or flight situation, much less to a fight or die situation. We could talk for decades to spell out the exact specifics of ethics in combat, and talk for decades more to whittle those ethics down to a list which everyone agreed to be able to undertake, but when the time comes and the consciousness is given the option between gross misconduct and the possibility of death, the former will always be the case. So I say to  those in question of the ethics of a fight against ISIS, no such war is just; even to balance the scale weighed upon its other side by a war most unjust. That does not mean we cannot fight, just that we must realize that what goes on in war, and specifically in the heat of battle, cannot be controlled and so cannot be constrained to ethical and unethical actions. The true atrocity in war is that the civilians whose tax money is funding these torture-prisons and ‘chemical experiments’ continue to agree to pay into a military budget because they are indoctrinated into thinking that their countrymen are over in some savage outland stopping the savagery as a bunch of gentlemen, killing only when needed and respecting the foreign children and women. When our soldiers are out on the battlefield, scared of anything that moves or makes a sound, they will act just as savage, and ruthlessly as the ‘mongrel horde’ which they face, if not more so. Killing is a most brutal sport, and although it seems unavoidable at times such as during the reign of the Nazi regime, and again now as the Islamic Holy War rages, it is necessary that the chain of violence is broken at some point with a brilliant act of supererogation. Violence begets violence as war begets war, and while retaliation against National Socialists, or against Radical Islamites may be morally permissible; any and all ways in which such retaliation unfold are morally impermissible. There are ways to settle disputes which do not involve blood, and such ways truly embody the meaning of civility. Thou shalt not kill, for thou art civilized.


Works Cited


Bremmer, Ian. “These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World’s Only Superpower”.              Time. Time Inc. 2015. Web. URL = http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/

Dyer, Gwynne. “Why Iraq?”. The Mess They Made. McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2007. 41 – 70.                Print.

Hersh, Seymour M. “Torture at Abu Ghraib: American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the        responsibility go?”. The New Yorker, 10/04/2004. Web. URL =                                                            http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib

Kelly, Tom. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy”. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public                  Affairs, April 17, 2014. Web. URL = http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2014/225003.htm

N.a. “TEST TUBE REPUBLIC: Chemical Weapons Tests in Panama and U.S. Responsibility”.                  Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). N.d. Web. 21/11/2015. URL =                                                       http://forusa.org/programs/panama/archives/chem-report/part2.htm

N.a. “Geneva Conventions”. Cornell University Law School. Legal Information Institute, N.d. Web.          16/11/2015. URL = https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions

N.a. “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and          of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. United Nations for Disarmament Affairs. N.d.                       Web. URL = http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/1925

N.a. “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations          concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.”                               International Committee of Red Cross. N.d. Web. 16/11/2015. URL =                                                   https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195

N.a. “Milestones: 1945 – 1952”. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, N.d. Web.                   16/11/2015. URL = https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/korean-war-2

N.a. “American Experience: My Lai”. PBS. Corporation for Public Broadcasting, n.d. Web.                        16/11/2015. URL =                                                                                                                                     http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/introduction/mylai/

Scott-Clark, Cathy, Adrian Levy. “Spectre Orange”. The Guardian. Guardian News and Media,                  29/03/2003. Web. 20/11/2015. URL =                                                                                                      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/29/usa.adrianlevy

Williams, Jeremy. “Kill ‘em all: The American Military in Korea”. BBC, 17/02/2011. Web.                        16/11/2015. URL = http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_usa_01.shtml

A Brief Clarification of Existence

Cyril C. House
Philosophy
01/10/2016


A Brief Clarification Of Existence

       Life is change. Everything about and within life is constantly changing, as is life itself, and therefore ‘Life’ and ‘Change’ are dialectically interchangeable. I should hope that this information is not new to you, my reader. Perhaps something that is just as commonly known, although much less commonly realized in an attentive and conscious manner, is change of self. Biologically one’s self is constantly dying off: every cell of every fraction of the human body dies off to be replaced by fresher and more lively cells; and this happens regularly, constantly. Psychologically the same occurrence takes place: one goes about life with beliefs and values and as experiences occur in the life of one, the experiences influence one’s beliefs regarding their beliefs and values. Sometimes the beliefs and values hold true against contrary evidence, but more often they are slightly altered: modified to correspond with the new information and the supplementary evidence regarding ‘the way things are’. Biologically, it only takes a moderate amount of slight changes here and there along the way before the entirety of what the body now consists of becomes completely replaced. Psychologically an identical happenstance occurs: beliefs and values are modified bit by bit until eventually nothing of what the original set of beliefs and values was exists any longer. Rene Descartes aside, it is difficult to deny that a human being, a person if you will, consists of a mind and of a body and without one or the other the person ceases to be such. So the query now becomes: if the mind and the body are regularly replaced to an extent that they no longer consist of anything that they once were, then is that mind plus body combination still the same person?

       Perhaps that is too complex to fathom the possibilities of, at this point in time, but it would be more manageable if simplified. Consider this then:

In ancient Greece, there was a legendary king named Theseus who supposedly founded the city of Athens. Since he fought many naval battles, the people of Athens dedicated a memorial in his honor by preserving his ship in the port. This “ship of Theseus” stayed there for hundreds of years. As time went on, some of the wooden planks of Theseus’ ship started rotting away. To keep the ship nice and complete, the rotting planks were replaced with new planks made of the same material. Here is the key question: If you replace one of the planks, is it still the same ship of Theseus? . . . What happens if you change two of the ship’s planks? Would that make it somehow less of the original ship than after one plank is changed? What if the ship consists of a hundred planks and forty-nine of the planks are changed? How about fifty-one changed planks? What about changing ninety-nine of the hundred planks? Is the single plank at the bottom of the ship enough to maintain the original lofty status of the ship? And what if all of the planks are changed? If the change is gradual, does the ship still maintain its status as the ship of Theseus? How gradual must the change be? (Yanofksy, P1:P2)

Now imagine that the ship is our person in question: after having all of his or her ‘planks changed’ is the person still the same ‘ship’? Yes the changed person is the same person before and after the change regardless of how complete the changing process is, and regardless of whether or not the change is gradual or instantaneous. Many argue that to alter the original components of anything, whether few or many (and especially all), whether gradually or instantaneously, is to alter the identity of the thing as well. Let it here be demonstrated that these suppositions are in fact not defensible.

       It is the case that if my kidney fails and I must have a transplant of it, then after the transplant takes place: the kidney which was just someone else’s, now becomes mine. The fact that all the organs which surround the ‘new’ kidney are mine and therefore the kidney is assimilated into my identity; the kidney becomes my own. Likewise if one plank of Theseus’ ship is swapped out, the surrounding planks assimilate the fresh plank’s identity into their own and the fresh plank is now identified as a plank of Theseus’ ship. Furthermore, suppose that six months after my kidney transplant, my other kidney fails and I have another donor organ installed next to the first one. The exact same thing happens: it is assimilated into my identity by the identity of the surrounding organs, even the transplanted kidney next to it helps to assimilate it, as we have already determined that the other kidney has become an organ of mine. The same holds true for planks of a ship, and the same holds true for values and beliefs.

       I will now prove that if the ship of Theseus is entirely disassembled, the pieces carried to an adjacent harbour, and there reassembled, that it is the exact same ship as was disassembled. For this I ask you to imagine a Lego set which provides you with the pieces and the map to construct ‘Johnny the Stegosaurus’. You take the pieces out of the box and build Johnny, then your mum asks you to get ready for bed and so you smash Johnny apart and return him to his box. The following day at playtime you select the Lego set, remove the pieces and again build the Stegosaurus. Is this Stegosaurus still Johnny? Of course it is! It says right on the box: “Build Johnny the Stegosaurus with these Lego pieces”. How could the Stegosaurus be any other Stegosaurus than Johnny?

       As for instantaneous change the analogy is simple enough: consider yourself now; and consider yourself now; and again consider yourself now. Did you assume a different identity from the time I first asked to the third? If you did then you are either a devil’s advocate looking for an argument (which you will lose) or you admit that you hold the same identity of self from one moment to the next. Guess what though? Change is constant and there are no states which are in-between change. From one moment to the next you and any/everyone/thing else in existence becomes slightly different, even if the only change is that the person or thing is now a moment older than it was.  If anything about an entity changes, is it still the exact same entity? No it could not be, for we have already established that there are differences, regardless of how minute. Although things about your identity and self from one moment to the next remain consistent enough that you do not notice the change, you are in fact never the exact same person you are at any other moment. Identity itself however, holds true throughout these instantaneous changes of self. If it did not then ‘identity’ would be entirely insubstantial and hold no true merit in discourse or thought. It does however: I am aware of myself and others of me and that is known as identity. Identity exists and therefore identity exists in the face of change, even instantaneous change.

       I feel I have justly and adequately proved that should you take Theseus’ ship and do any one or any many things to it (Theseus’ ship), it will remain to be: Theseus’ ship. Oneself, likewise, may undergo massive and constant change, alteration, augmentation, dismemberment et cetera, and still have one’s identity remain constant. Identity is the one thing you will never lose and the one thing which can never be taken from you. Without identity nothing would exist, without identity this discourse could not be.





Works Cited

Yanofksy, Noson S. Utne Reader. Ogden Publications, Inc., November 2013. Web. 05/03/2015.                http://www.utne.com/mind-and-body/ship-of-theseus-identity-ze0z1311zjhar.aspx







White Man Bringin' Us Down

Cyril C. House
English
22/01/2015


White Man Bringin’ Us Down

       Sherman Alexie's story Flight Patterns is the fictional account of a young aboriginal man named William on his way to work, whom encounters an Ethiopian man named Fekadu. The story engages with cultural stereotype from a direct, first-person perspective of this aboriginal man living in the United States of America. Through this first-person view the reader is able to experience a stream of consciousness type narrative which helps put stereotyping in perspective. Stereotyping is inevitable and is not at all restricted to minorities, which is made readily evident by the numerous cultural references in the text; it is a natural function of the human brain to stereotype others.

       Before Alexie has not yet expended an entire paragraph before he puts forth some stereotypical humor, informing the reader that "[William is] the bemused and slightly embarrassed owner of a twenty-first-century American mind" (266). This statement is a little bit more subtle than some of the remarks William and Fekadu will make later on, but is ironically a very key point in the whole tale. The white man made up 77.7% of the U.S. population census in 2012 (USCB line 9) and it is safe to say that when the topic of cultural stereotyping comes up, most people’s minds picture the stereotyping of ethnic minorities by the white man. That is precisely why William thinking this thought is so brilliant, is that the thought itself is a jest and a stereotype at the white man. Let us assume that by the term American, it is white-American what is implied. Now allow me to pull the referenced sentence apart for you: the twenty-first-century American mind is a reference to the mind of an American at a point in the information age when knowledge is considered absolute power. The typical American will rack up massive amounts of data in its head drawing parallels between knowledge and power. The problem with this is that the types of knowledge the American is putting away up there is completely useless crap! It memorizes the names of singer-songwriters, the names of the wives of those sing-songwriters, what those singer-songwriters like to eat for breakfast et cetera; the type of information which the only potential application of would be to participate in the television show Jeopardy (in other words there is no true application at all for this information). The average American is so busy concerning itself with useless scraps of information like this that it is all too often topics of very real concern and potential benefit are entirely overlooked. Bemused is how William refers to this state of mind. Bemused is to be “lost in thought; preoccupied” (Bemused adj. 2) and it is with this word in particular that William sends a politically-correct zinger out at the jaw of the great white man. This is also why William feels “slightly embarrassed” (Alexie 266), because as a proud aboriginal man he expects himself to be above the sways of the impressionable white oppressor. As it would appear however, it is easier than one might think to fall victim to such an error of ways.

       As William continues along his morning’s journey he is joined by a black cab driver named Fekadu. In the back of the cab William dialogues internally, reflecting on his many trips to the airport he concludes that about three quarters of all his trips through security he has been stopped for a ‘random’ security check (273). This clearly calls into question exactly how random such checkpoints are. William wishes to continue dwelling upon life while he is driven to the airport but Fekadu insists on engaging William in polite conversation. Throughout the course of the two men’s discussion it becomes apparent that racism and cultural stereotypes are hardly contained within the opinions of the white majority. Referring to shortly after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, William tells Fekadu “I was scared of little brown guys . . . I started looking around for big white guys because I figured they’d be undercover cops” (277). What the reader is exposed to within this statement is two-fold: a minority (aboriginal William) stereotyping a minority (little brown guys, known to refer to Arabic men) as well as a minority (again William) stereotyping a (or the rather) majority (big white guys). This stereotype of the typical large Caucasian male presents wonderful evidence to support the claim that stereotyping is inevitable. Too often it is that stereotyping is assumed to be negative and derogatory; positive, inflating assumptions of another’s character are just as common, if not more so, and are just as dangerous. Consider being a large white man, a pacifist and conservative Christian with a family: now imagine that while on a plane being hi-jacked that all the passengers hide behind you and push you towards the terrorist to stop him (or her). The other passengers’ stereotype of you as someone whom can and will protect them has not only been grossly misplaced, yet has also left you in a very dangerous situation.

       Now in this short narrative by Sherman Alexie, there appears to have been captured an absolute array of stereotyping. Non-white people stereotyping white people, white people stereotyping non-white people, and non-white people stereotyping non-white people. It seems no ethnicity is safe from others’ judgments about them; nor is any ethnicity exempt from making judgments about others. It is simply unavoidable that the human brain will take sensory information (especially sight in these cases) and use that information to draw conclusions (assumptive conclusions) about what it is experiencing.





Works Cited


Alexie, Sherman. “Flight Patterns.” Lisa Chalykoff et al. The Broadview Introduction to Literature.            Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2013. 265-282. Print.

No eds. State And County QuickFacts. The U.S. Census Bureau, 03/12/2014. Web. 22/01/2015.                http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html

"bemused." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 22 Jan. 2015. <Dictionary.com                    http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bemused>.


The Best Part of Beauty Is That Which No Picture Can Express

Cyril C. House
English
18/02/2015


“The Best Part of Beauty Is That Which No Picture Can Express” (Francis Bacon)


       William Wordsworth presents a magnificent piece of romantic poetry Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey: On Revisiting the Banks of The Wye during a Tour, July 13, 1798. In this poem the reader is shown that although time often wears heavily on a soul throughout the course of its life, time can also be a revitalizing force. The reader is permitted to journey alongside Wordsworth as he looks upon the River Wye/ Wye Valley and its associated scenery after having spent many years away from the same location. In contrast to the careless and fretful nature which characterize the speaker’s youth, as time passes he is overtaken with a certain revitalization of his now weary being; this passage of time reveals the sublimity of the world to him the speaker.

       Wordsworth has been away from the sight of the Wye for many years now and is glad to be back within the beautiful, natural sight.  He recounts his first experience of the beautiful visage, likening himself to a young buck “bound[ing] o’er the mountains, by the sides/ Of the deep rivers, and the lonely streams,/ Wherever nature led; more like a man/ Flying from something that he dreads, than one/ Who sought the thing he loved” (968). The thing he loved is known to be nature, and the River Wye/ Wye Valley is the epitomical idealization of this nature. It can be supposed that if nature is that which he loved and did not know until he came across it, then that which he dreads and is, as a result, fleeing from can be understood as not-nature. In other words, the monotonous grind of city life with the towering buildings of brick and concrete and not a fresh speck of air to breathe for miles around.

       Having been exposed to the ‘city life’ for such an extensive time since the Wye was last taken in, Wordsworth has become rather worn down and dreary in his outlook on the being of things. Although memories of the glorious Wye invigorate him as he drones along the day to day hustle of the English streets, he has now returned and is able to take in the magical sights of the River Wye/ Wye Valley first-hand and it has absolutely recharged him: “And now, with gleams of half-extinguish’d thought,/ With many recognitions dim and faint,/ And somewhat of a sad perplexity,/ The pictures of the mind revives again:/ While here I stand, not only with the sense/ Of present pleasure, but with pleasing thoughts/ That in this moment is life and food/ For future years” (967). Wordsworth proposes a blissful source of sustenance not only for himself in future years, but also for his young sister who is along with him on this tour of his(/theirs). His sister’s presence ignites an even brighter spark in his old soul as he is able to look upon her as she gazes out at the beauty surrounding them and see the same life and love of the scene in her eyes as he had when first experiencing the Wye many years ago (969).

       Long ago Wordsworth looked out upon the Wye with the same youthful reverence as does now his sweetest sibling, and although he has not lost any amount of love and awe in any way whatsoever for the Wye (more specifically for nature itself), he cannot look upon it quite the same as all those years ago for his, now mature, perception of nature has evolved into something much more distinct. “For I have learned/ To look on nature, not as in the hour/ Of thoughtless youth . . . And I have felt/ A presence that disturbs me with the joy/ Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime/ Of something far more deeply interfused” (968). It is clear that the effect of nature no longer holds solely a brilliant and euphoric aesthetic claim, yet also now that it holds some sort of a deeper intellectual pleasure, perhaps a morally transcending sense of all things. Again at communion with nature Wordsworth is now able to see both physically and metaphorically how all aspects of life fit together to compliment and support each other and how without any of the aspects of life, or nature, the whole could not continue to exist so serenely: “the round ocean, and the living air,/ And the blue sky, and in the mind of man,/ A motion and a spirit, that impels/ All thinking things, all objects of thought,/ And rolls through all things” (968).

       Nature is an omnipotent force in Wordsworth’s life and has been so from the beginning, although after many years of worshipping her (nature) he is bestowed with an exceptionally new and vivid understanding of all the things which she represents and is a part of. Having started out as but a lad, loving nature for her more obvious niceties, as life continues and he is able to re-commune with nature again and again, both in the physical world as well as in his memory, Wordsworth becomes privy to the more subtle niceties of nature and it is through this revelation that he comes to understand the true sublimity of the world he inhabits.






Works Cited

"Francis Bacon." BrainyQuote.com. Xplore Inc, 2015. 17 February 2015.                                                    http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/f/francisbac117825.html

Wordsworth, William. “Lines Writtten a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey: On Revisiting the banks of        the Wye during a Tour, July 13, 1798.” Lisa Chalykoff et al. The Broadview Introduction to                Literature. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2013. 966-970. Print.



Philosophically Unskilled

Cyril C. House
English
01/10/2016



Philosophically Unskilled

Watchmen is a historiographical meta-fiction novel based in the United States of America during the Cold War, the mid nineteen eighties. The concept of the story is that individuals have turned to costumed vigilante crime fighting as a way to combat the inability of the societal systems in place to reap appropriate retribution upon criminals. Although at the time the story of the novel itself is actually occurring costumed vigilantism has been banned by a government bill known as the Keene Act, there still exist many ‘ex-masks’, and some of the masks never quit with the Keene Act, instead these few continue to reign down justice upon the scum of the country and defy the government mandate. Rorschach is one such man, who vows never to compromise “not even in the face of Armageddon” (Watchmen 402).

As the tale continues the reader encounters Adrian Vaidt, the first mask to out his identity to the world and build a multi-billion dollar enterprise out of his own image. Vaidt spends millions of dollars funding research into an infinite energy source in a front which he suggests to the world is an attempt to eliminate that which the United States and Soviet Union are about to go to (nuclear) war over: resources. Vaidt’s true intent however is to blow up New York by teleporting a giant sentient monstrosity into the city. The instability of the teleportation technique is what causes the explosion, and after the blast clears there is a massive octopus-like creature, which looms over the remaining skyscrapers, and is wreaking havoc upon the rest of the city. The world in general, not understanding where this beast did or could have come from, assumes it is a being of extraterrestrial nature. Quickly realizing that the world has bigger problems than communists and democrats: the United States and the Soviet Union suspend their feud in order to unite against this grand new threat. This suspension is what prevents nuclear war between the two countries, which would have undoubtedly resulted in holocaust and the annihilation of the human race. As it turns out, Vaidt had predicted this result to the catastrophe. Peace was the hidden agenda of his hidden agenda. He sacrificed millions to save billions, and the entirety of the blame (of all those deaths) was laid not upon he who engineered the proceedings, and Vaidt thus suffers no retribution for the extinguishment of millions of human lives. Is what Vaidt did, killing millions of people, justified in the face of the greater evil of holocaust? It certainly is. Vaidt exercised an ancient philosophical technique known as ‘The Noble Lie’.

“In politics, a noble lie is a myth or untruth, often, but not invariably, of a religious nature, knowingly told by an elite to maintain social harmony” (Wikipedia Noble Lie). Vaidt, as a billionaire captain of industry is certainly to be considered as an ‘elite’, and he fabricates a massive untruth about the slaughter of millions of New Yorkers, which ultimately serves to maintain the social harmony of the world. There is a great deal of disharmony between the Americans and the Soviets at this time and if the conflict escalates anymore then the doom of the world is surely at hand. Vaidt’s conspicuous actions, although on the surface brutal, savage and completely unethical; underneath that grimy surface show their true nature as altruistically brilliant and utterly ethical. His lie is thus a noble one. If there were an alternative solution to the problem at hand, then his actions would no longer be justified, but as Vaidt so gracefully puts it: “both sides realized the suicidal implications of nuclear conflict, yet couldn’t stop racing towards it lest their opponents should overtake them. Afraid of their weapons, afraid of losing them, afraid to blink or turn their backs” (Watchmen 369) it becomes clear that the political situation and stress becomes more and more real and more and more serious every day regardless of what is said or what is done or what is known about the outcome should the war jump off. The world has come far past the critical point where they could have turned around, and it is nothing short of a miracle that Vaidt is able to do just that at this point in the events, so far after that critical moment.

Immanuel Kant, a brilliant eighteenth-century philosopher, argues that lying is absolutely wrong in all circumstances. He claims that human beings are given free will and rational thought processes for a reason, this reason being to make their own choices about their own lives in the best way they know how with the information they possess. It is in this sense that lying becomes not only a disservice to the humanity of the person telling the lie, but also to the humanity of he/she/they whom are being lied to. Therefore, of one’s self, to lie is to attempt to influence the choices of others and as such is degrading to one’s own character and dignity. Of the other, to lie to, is to deprive him/her/them of the accurate information required to make an informed and rational decision (SCU Para. 4-5). I do not presume to state that as great a man as Kant was ‘wrong’ per say, only that he seems to have either not taken a count of all the necessary data regarding the matter, or that he would appear to have grossly overestimated the capabilities of the human race, which would be an easy lapse to have back in the eighteenth-century, before globalization had occurred. It is true that every human being, to some degree or extent, has free will (whether exercised or not). It is also true that rational thought walks hand-in-hand with that same concept of free will. Therefore is it not accurate to agree with Kant that lying is wrong, based on his reasoning? No, it is no longer accurate to do so. By the mid-eighties setting in Watchmen globalization of resources, commodities, people, and of course feuds has already taken vast steps of progress in the international community. There are now either single persons or small groups of persons whom hold an alarming amount of control over gigantic portions of the world’s surface. Nixon is in control, and speaks for more than two hundred million people; not all of whom agree or are on board with his claims, motives, agendas et cetera. The Communist Soviet government, likewise spoke for nearly three hundred million people. Is this then, not already contradicting the standards set forth by Kant? Unless everyone a person ‘speaks for’ is in agreement with that which is being spoken, then what right does the speaker have to continue to not only speak, but also make decisions (huge, life changing decision) on behalf of these persons? Yet we see it going on regardless and the result will be catastrophic, the United States government “have become intoxicated with Omnipotence-by-Association” (Glass 3) in the wake of their ‘American-God’ Dr. Manhattan and have begun to “push their unearned advantage until American influence comes uncomfortably close to key areas of Soviet interest” (Glass 3). This, more than, suggests that the American government is pushing for war. Perhaps not directly, but they are pushing for more control of the world than they have any right to, and also pushing for control in their own interests (in other words, this push for control is not the will of the people). It is difficult to imagine how one (Nixon) could fathom the push for control not leading to all out nuclear war. Nonetheless he (Nixon) is permitted to keep making decisions for his two hundred million constituents, likely because of widespread propaganda which tricks the Americans into thinking his way is the right way. Now, after much digression I conclude that Vaidt’s lie is now one-hundred-fold justified, as it serves to (at the very least) undermine the authority of the out-of-control superpower The United States of America.
I will reiterate: “In politics, a noble lie is a myth or untruth, often, but not invariably, of a religious nature, knowingly told by an elite to maintain social harmony” (Wikipedia Noble Lie). Nixon’s lies (propaganda) to the American people, serve to enforce his imperialistic agenda which is the exact opposite of ‘maintaining social harmony’ and is therefore unjustified. Vaidt’s lie (the indirect lie concerning the nature of the ‘alien’ beast) is to correct this social disharmony created by the true lie(s) of Nixon and in correcting the disharmony, accordingly creates harmony. Vaidt’s lie is thus just.



Works Cited

Glass, Milton. “Dr. Manhattan: Super-Powers and the Superpowers.” Watchmen. New ed. Alan                  Moore. New York: DC Comics, 2014. 139-142. Print.

Mazur, Tim C. Santa Clara University. Santa Clara University. N.d. Web. 15/03/2015                                http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v6n1/lying.html

Moore, Alan, Dave Gibbons, John Higgins. Watchmen. New ed. New York: DC Comics, 2014. Print.

“Noble Lie.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation. 14/02/2008. Web. 15/03/2015.                                          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_lie

Love Lost

Cyril C. House
English- Shakespeare
12/11/2015

Love Lost

       Art embodies an individually ideal idolism of the life of mankind, and the finer the art the finer the example; the stronger the metaphor. Art is an expression of pure life, often so pure it is most difficult to comprehend or even see how the two can be so intimately related for we are so accustomed to the diluted essence of that which makes us human. We then are shocked and appalled at watching a Shakespearian tragedy unfold on stage because of the seemingly ceaseless suffering and heartache which occurs. But why should we be so appalled at such things? Our own lives are full of bad times, of our families slowly dying off and sometimes too our friends; except in the real world this all happens in this diluted sense, and so we think that it does not happen like it happens in tragedies. For tragedies accentuate the turmoil of life, leaving both the benevolent as well as the mundane times out of the picture so that the audience may better study what it is that makes the bad times bad, perhaps so too to aid our understanding of what it is that makes the good the good. One of the particular themes in Shakespearian tragedy is Love, and as is plain to see in the example of King Lear, characters whom immerse themselves in acts of love are weakened or made irrational by their adherence to such an emotion. Othello is another classic example of the degenerative nature of love upon its courtier.

       King Lear provides a prime example for demonstrating the case of my argument: love is mankind’s folly and consistently leads one into a state of decay; as it turns out we are in fact blind to our greatest disability. In fact we are so ignorant of it that we profess it as an achievement worthy of blessed afterlife, salvation, and many other, more physical, types of treasures:

King Lear once ruled in this land
With princely power and peace,
And had all things with heart’s content
That might his joys increase.
Amongst those gifts that nature gave
Three daughters fair had he,
So princely-seeming beautiful
As fairer could not be (King Lear 280).

       So here we have King Lear, and Lear is a baller: massive coffers filled with gold, expansive territorial claims, mad respect from all the Dukes of his land. What more could a guy ask for? How about the precious gift of children? Three girls to be precise, and his love for them is without limit. He wishes to express his love by retiring and dividing his riches and land between the three girls:

Know we have divided
In three our kingdom, and ‘tis our first intent
To shake all cares and business off our state,
Confirming them on younger years (1.37-40).

       The kingdom does not divide into three equal pieces however, and so Lear must decide which daughter to offer the largest piece to. Such a difficult decision though, a larger piece of the kingdom will implicitly state an advanced degree of love for the chosen child, and Lear loves each of his daughters so much that he cannot have them thinking he favours one over  the others; alas one of them must receive the largest portion. The decision is reached that it would be best to allow them to compete with one another for the prize spot, both in the kingdom as well as in their father’s affections, and the most appropriate way to decide who ‘gets the most love’ is to determine which of the three loves him the most:

Tell me, my daughters,
Which of you shall we say doth love us the most, 
That we our largest bounty may extend
Where merit doth most challenge it? (1.44-7) 

       Proceeding from eldest to youngest, the girls each have an opportunity to profess their love before the King, their father. The eldest child, Gonoril, as well as the middle child, Regan, both verbally-prostrate themselves before the court in expressing their affections and admiration of Lear. However when it is Cordelia’s, the youngest daughter, turn she has nothing to say except:

You have begot me, bred me, loved me.
I return those duties back as are right fit-
   Obey you, love you, and most honour you.
Why have my sisters husbands if they say
   They love you at all? Haply when I shall wed
That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry
   Half my love with him, half my care and duty.
Sure, I shall never marry like my sisters,
   To love my father all (1.88-95).

       She speaks harsh words, not at her father yet, at her sisters. She tells Lear that she loves him only as much as she owes him to, no less and no more, but perhaps this is misleading in itself because ‘as much as she owes him’ is an infinite amount! The same amount of love as he holds for her, which from parent to child is not measurable for sheer quantity. Now she discredits her sisters’ professions of love, arguing to the fact that they, unlike Cordelia, are married, and marriage is a bond of love so therefore their love is divided between husband and father, making it an amount only half of Cordelia’s own. Finally Cordelia, in the last two lines quoted above, claims she will never marry so that her love for Lear is never divided and thus absolutely pure and true. Lear in his senility (1.278-83) divides his kingdom between his two eldest daughters, meanwhile disowning and banishing Cordelia from the land because he feels rejected by this daughter who he so does love:

Let her be thine we 
Have no such daughter, nor shall ever see
That face of hers again. Therefore be gone, 
Without our grace, our love, our benison (1.252-55). 

       The only reason for him to so absolutely reject someone who he loves is that he feels hurt, rejected by her, and therefore if she will not love him nor shall he love her. This rejection of Cordelia is clearly an outward show and only serves to provide a foil to his inward feelings for his youngest daughter. In an ironic twist of fate Gonoril and Regan, in taking control of the kingdom, immediately cast out old Lear to starve as a beggar. They have their power and riches and therefore find no more use in loving him, and so we find it a fault of Lear’s to love, his love for Cordelia led him to such rash decisions for fear the love was not requited. It is the love which makes Lear fearful, and it is the fear which makes him foolish. Through the tale’s progression Lear admits to himself that he was wrong to cast Cordelia out, and through certain powers they are reunited and the true degree of love between the two is felt:

[R]estoration hang
Thy medicine on my lips, and let this kiss
Repair those violent harms that my two sisters
Have in thy reverence made! (21.24-7)

       Cordelia is asking the being she calls Restoration to endow her lips with the power to ease her father’s suffering when she kisses him. Cordelia loves her father so much she vows to take back his kingdom from her wretched sisters, and for her attempt she is captured and hung (24.248-57); leaving Lear to die of heartbreak at having lost her (24.306-12). Cordelia’s love for her father leads her to be brash in her actions, and such brashness leads to her death; so we find it a fault of Cordelia’s to have loved.

King Lear’s deep seated affections for his daughter Cordelia are demonstrated in a particularly atypical form which the reader could easily overlook. Lear is vastly and immeasurably dictated by his failing grasp at love. His desire for love, and his having sought after love (the love of his daughters), led him to the situation in which he divides his kingdom into two instead of three, and from there the degeneration of all aspects of Lear’s life truly commence. His physical state declines rapidly as his two eldest daughters attempt to symbolically crush his sway over the kingdom’s people’s hearts:

Pray, let’s hit together. If our
father carry authority with such disposition as he bears,
this last surrender of his will but offend us (1.292-94).

       The mental degradation which Lear undergoes is much more subtle, and it has been proposed that it truly occurs around Scene XI, during which Lear and his small train arrive in the swamp with a vicious storm blowing; it is the storm which is viewed as the manifestation of Lear’s madness. I am in agreement that Lear’s journey amidst the violent storm is indeed the outward manifestation of his madness; however I am confident that madness did not simply come upon Lear at this point. Madness is a fust which encroaches from the inside out, an elusive chiding of the conscience which builds up to such a point that it then bursts from the mind and spills into the world around. The storm in the swamp has been designated as the bursting forth from the mind of Lear’s madness. What then is the elusive chiding of conscience? It is the Fool. It is noted that Lear’s Fool disappears after Scene XIII, we encounter Lear next in Scene XXI and he is without his Fool, however Cordelia is now present. If we go back to the beginning of the play we shall notice that Cordelia is cast out by Lear in Scene I, and the next time the reader encounters Lear is in Scene V, and along with his Fool. Every scene, after Scene I and before Scene XIV, in which the king is present, the Fool is present also (McLean). This leads one to believe that the absence of Cordelia has a unique role to play in the presence of the fool. One theory is that Lear needs someone to take care of him and so when Cordelia leaves the Fool appears, and when Cordelia appears the Fool leaves. I believe it is something similar, yet much deeper than this. I believe that the Fool is the anthropomorphization of the degenerative effects of love on Lear’s mind. Lear has done something which he feels is just, in exiling his youngest daughter. However his mind retains its love of her even after, and represents such fact through the Fool. Lear loves her so much that he cannot let her go, and so she lives on in his mind and his heart through the embodiment of the Fool which, as we have discussed, leads Lear into exponentially more degenerative states until he finally admits to himself that he was wrong to cast Cordelia out, and that she must love him after all; but by the time such an admission is made Lear has already gone mad from his despair over the lost love of his daughter and there is no getting him back.

       A second prime example of the corruptive influence of love is the case of Othello, Branbantio, and Desdemona. Desdemona is Brabantio’s only child and he has raised and educated her to respect her place in the order of things, yet even with such engendered learnings spoiling her very blood she elopes with Othello. Brabantio loves his daughter dearly and when learning of her subtle marriage to the Moor he proclaims that his


[P]articular grief 
Is of so flood-gate and o’er-bearing nature 
That it engluts and swallows other sorrows, 
And it is still itself.” (Othello 1.3.56-9). 


       ‘Particular grief’ references the marriage and it causes Brabantio to experience an overwhelming sorrow ‘so flood-gate and o’er-bearing nature’. The sorrow he experiences is so cataclysmic, so monstrous that it could seemingly devour the sorrows of the world and yet not be any more sorrowful itself, it is the epitome of all sorrows and is as dense as a sorrow can possibly be. The sorrow of which no greater sorrow might be fathomed. This sorrow is a result of his broken heart, his defiled parental love for this girl, his daughter. He desires with all his heart, to keep her from Othello (1.3.193-4), that she might not become so estranged from his life and wishes for her that he may continue to love her as his own. But she has committed to loving the Moor and so she accepts the disavowal of her father (1.3.192) in order to be true to her husband (1.3.187-8). Consequentially Brabantio is slain by his sorrow:

[P]ure grief 
Shore his old thread in twain (5.2.203-4). 

       The relationship of Desdemona and Othello seems to embody a most powerful bond, with which the two lovers would seem to proceed. Apparently not so strong however, as to prohibit Othello from believing she is a gallivanting strumpet the moment it is suggested to him that she has been acting curiously. Even before such discourse takes place Othello is frightened for her chastity: Iago, Othello’s devious ensign, simply shifts his own attitude to one of discomfort as he and Othello chat about Desdemona, and the Moor is suddenly aghast with inquiry as to the particulars of Iago’s unease (3.3.94-119). Iago has simply mentioned his disapproval of Cassio hanging out with Desdemona and of his departure, which falls short of addressing himself to the men, yet relentlessly does Othello attempt to drag convictions from his ensign’s mouth:

As if there [are] some monster in thy thought
Too hideous to be shown. Thou dost mean something: 
I heard thee say even now thou likedst not that, 
When Cassio left my wife. What didst not like? (3.3.110-13). 

       In case your mind happened to read that last quote in a tone which connotes Othello’s defense of his wife’s honour, be assured otherwise when nine lines later Othello speaks:

I know thou’rt full of love and honesty [Iago], 
And weigh’st thy words before thou giv’st them breath, 
Therefore these stops of thine fright me the more- (3.3.122-24). 

       The man is practically shaking with distress! His mind has gone full-tilt before anything of merit has even been said. Othello is mad with love, and his madness of love allows his madness of jealousy. Love is the fault in his person which kites him, down along the path of dangerous possessiveness; ultimately resulting in his uncivilized termination of this poor girl’s life. Taking the life of Desdemona in such a barbaric manner as to smother her with a pillow amongst her wedding sheets, leads directly to his own suicide for having killed her (after he finds out that Iago has been plotting against him the entire time). The Moor of Venice hath been slain by the loss of a woman he so loved, a loss propagated by his own hand, out of a jealousy which love itself hath provided him; Othello is entirely consumed by the experience of love, ironically following neatly behind Brabantio on his course to the afterlife.

Love has been shown in these two instances to be a supreme force of utter degeneration and sabotage. If these two examples have anything to say about the fault of love within us then it is this: Love will override all faculties of reason and logic, and will cause one to become irrationally paranoid about rational situations, which will lead to a decay of one’s quality of life before finally taking that life from one.  King Lear believed that an expression of love was the most honest way to determine one’s love for another and quickly discovered that the ability to ‘heave one’s heart into one’s mouth’ is a poor technique with which to gauge compassion and reverence. Lear was able to adjust this mistake later on, only to unknowingly coerce his one true daughter into a situation which resulted in her death, and also his own. Brabantio’s love for Desdemona, his darling daughter, led him directly to death when she exchanged his love for the love of her new husband Othello. That exchange proceeded to cause Othello to become hyperactively paranoid and draw untrue conclusions about her nature, leading him to kill her for rebuke of his love towards her. Then upon discovery that he had terminated the life of one who loved him so much as to brave his paranoia and fret, and realizing he now had to live with such a loss he was compelled to take his own life in an ironic love triangle between daughter, father, husband, and wife. Love is the betrayer of man and it is a vicious emotion to court, therefore to grant man the ability to not love would be a truly ultimate blessing as it would provide rational thought the room required to work, and consequently provide man with the room required to truly grow as a rational being. For “is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man? . . . [Furthermore] the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love . . . And if this is true, Love is the love of the beautiful and not of deformity . . . And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not . . . Then love wants and has not beauty . . . And [you would not call] that beautiful which wants and has not beauty . . . [And] [i]s not the good also the beautiful? Yes. [Therefore] in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good” (Plato).





Works Cited

Shakespeare, William. King Lear. Stanley Wells Ed. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford University              Press Inc.: New York, 2000. Print.

Shakespeare, William. Othello. Michael Neill Ed. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford University Press        Inc.: New York, 2006. Print.

McLean, Ralph. “‘And My Poor Fool Is Hanged’ - The Double Role Of Cordelia And The Fool In

King Lear”. Britain in Print. N.d. Web. 27/11/2015. URL =                                                                            http://www.britaininprint.net/shakespeare/study_tools/poor_fool_lear.html

Plato. “Symposium”. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. The Internet Classics Archive, N.d. Web. 23/11/2015.        URL = http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html


A Swift Plan of Action

Cyril C. House
English
19/01/2015


A Swift Plan of Action


Jonathan Swift was an Anglo-Irish writer in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He was well known for sticking it to the man (the oppressing English, whom controlled Ireland at the time) generally via a series of political publications such as pamphlets and essays. His fame did not end with the times: he is still a revered essayist today, nearly three centuries after his death. Swift wrote A Modest Proposal in response to the problems of overpopulation and lack of food within Ireland at the time. In the essay Swift assumes the air of an English oppressor in order to satirically critique the corrupt practices of the English bourgeoisie in Ireland.

To properly criticize the oppressive English regime Swift tells the story, if you will, from their point of view. The English have control of Ireland and are exploiting the country and its inhabitants of their resources in an effort to come out ahead economically for themselves. Swift, or the narrator rather, reveals a clue to the identity of the narrator when it is said "the money will circulate among ourselves, the goods being entirely of our own growth and manufacture" (1397). We just have established the monetary hierarchy of the relationship between the English and the Irish. Thus we can easily conclude from the first half of this statement that the narrator in fact is an English oppressor. This claim is strongly reinforced by the second half of the statement which refers to the growth and manufacture of goods. In this instance it is implied that 'the goods' are the Irish people. In the eyes of the English they (the English) generously allow the Irish to continue living on this land of theirs. In exchange the Irish manufacture goods for the English which are taken and exported for monetary gain. As the narrator is praising his (or her) own luck and mindfulness in coming across the idea of selling and eating the children of the Irish proletariat he again reveals and confirms his (or her) lineage by recognizing one of the chief qualities of his plan as being  that it "incurs[s] no danger in disobliging England" (1398). If by this point in the essay one has not picked up on the fact that the English do things solely for their own benefit then let this remark serve as verification. The narrator which Swift utilizes to toss out blows at the English is especially effective because in one swift move he intends to end over-population and the dire lack of food by selling and eating the children of the Irish proletariat. To solve the problems of the Irish is a very charitable endeavor indeed. On an entirely other hand however, the way in which it is proposed to deal with the problems is at once barbarous and unthinkable to anyone who truly does care about these people (indeed care enough to desire to end their woes). This witty technique, in all its double-edged glory, parallels the style which the English were actually employing to address the situation: on a front they would seem to care, but the reality of their decisions showed a much different attitude.

Now that it has been discussed exactly how Swift did what he did with A Modest Proposal perhaps it ought to now be touched upon precisely what it is which he did in such a way. Swift’s marvellous exercise of the English narrator in this essay shows the apparent point of view, towards the Irish people, of the English in the real world at the time when it was written. The point of view defines the Irish subjects as something grossly less than human. Immediately as the essay begins we see the narrator proposing that  a wonderful way to deal with the problems of the Irish proletariat would be any way at all which is “a fair, cheap, and easy method” (1392). The reader has yet to come across the “fair, cheap, and easy method” (1392) which the narrator is getting at, and even so this statement jumps out at one as rather malicious and vile. It is a problem or problems of the Irish people is it not? People being the keyword here. People such as you and I are deserving of some semblance of respect and a person or people’s trouble are befitting of a little more than care and attention to solve. In six seemingly harmless words the narrator has already suggested that the Irish and their problems are suited to any solution which solves the problem without committing any real effort or expense. Contradicting the model of people we just have supposed, this statement infers that the Irish are not people at all. A few paragraphs later the narrator seems to have a change of heart whilst discussing how the proletariat can be bred to avoid unnecessary population growth. His (or her) action plan affords that a single male shall be sufficient to impregnate four females. At first glance one may take in this information with a roiling belly, thinking of how savage a concept this seems, when in fact a one to four ratio is “more than we allow to sheep, black cattle, or swine” (1394). One to four is a very generous offer indeed. Whatever brownie points the narrator may have been appointed for such a generous offer regarding the breeding of the proletariat: they are hotly contested when he (or she) goes on to suggest “buying the children alive and dressing them hot from the knife, as [they] do roasting pigs” (1395). In case the context of the sentence leaves any question as to what is being suggested here, the narrator has proposed that every person of able age and skill ought to be able to pull a baby out of storage to kill, skin, and cook it right then and there. This is the best way to get quality skin for baby leather and will also yield a more tender and succulent meat.

Modest:  “having or showing regard for the decencies of behavior” (Dictionary.com, adj. #3). The narrator has clearly expressed a desire to assist the unfortunate Irish proletariat in ending their misery. This is a decent goal to aspire to, a modest goal. The style in which he (or she) has suggested dealing with the issues at hand is a gross indecency to any sort of living creature, although especially to another human being. This is an indecent solution; an immodest suggestion. So if one proposes an immodest solution in order to attain a modest end then where does the ball lie when deciding whether attaining the end via the suggestion is a modest or immodest act? To the English in this particular case, the ball lay with the former; to the Irish, the latter. Do you think the English would be justified in such beliefs? When you solve a problem for another how often do you spend time considering how the other might view your solution? On the contrary how often do you come up with a solution and think ‘well there is that one solved, on to the next one’. How is it that you judge decency?







Works Cited


Swift, Jonathan. "A Modest Proposal.” The Broadview Introduction to Literature. Lisa Chalykoff et          al. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2013. 1391-1399. Print.
     
"Modest." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 19 Jan. 2015. Web.