Killing In The Name Of..

Cyril C House

International Relations

Killing In The Name Of..

    In March of 2011, in Syria, pro-democracy protests erupted which contested the autocratic regime being led by Bashar al-Assad. Assad responded to the protesters with lethal force, and in doing so sparked the brewing powder keg of revolution. The war that followed has been catastrophic. More than 250,000 Syrians have been killed in the conflict, more than 11,000,000 have been forced from their homes. In a three-sided civil war between the country’s government, pro-democracy rebels, and Islamic State jihadists, there seems to be no end to the savagery and atrocities being committed. The power struggle has lost any strong tether to one side or another and is now up for grabs, and it seems that the world powers have begun to take notice.

Today there are multiple layers to the Syrian Conflict, there  are now rebels fighting the government, rebels fighting the jihadists, and jihadists beheading anyone they come across. Additionally, the Syrian governmental regime has several ‘big sock supporters’, Russia among these, while the rebels have their own ‘big sock backing’, the United States among these. Is this a coincidence, the fact that old time Cold War rivals find themselves on rivaling sides of a conflict which has little to do with either of them? I assure you it is no coincidence. This is a proxy war between the two great powers and if there is a state which has little to do with this conflict that state is, ironically, Syria. This is a power struggle which goes far beyond the borders of Syria to encompass the entire international power structure of the modern world. There is a battle against corruption playing out, and corruption’s name is ‘America’. I will argue that the primary reason for Russian support of the Assad regime is to push back against, what has become, the American bid for global domination in a world that no longer views  ‘the conqueror’ as legitimate. The neorealist lens is the tool which will best aid your understanding of my argument as I delve into the murky waters of American power strategies over the last several decades. This should provide ample backing to support my secondary claim, that America is vying for global domination while attempting to maintain its facade as one of the world’s ‘good guys’. I will then conclude by addressing my primary claim, that Russia is proxy warring in Syria as a means of pushing back against the American hegemon. Guerisoli suggests that the Syrian Civil War is not really a proxy war due to the major military powers’ direct actions in the conflict, rather than just simply supporting one or another side. However, in this paper I will be referring to it as a proxy war due to the context of my thesis which suggests that the major powers are fighting in Syria as an indirect means of combatting each other, and as such I find the war to remain worthy of the proxy qualification.

Framework

    Allow me to touch on the conceptual framework, of neorealism, within which I will be working herein. Neorealism evolved out of classical realism, both realist blocks are still in popular use to this day and each of these two blocks also has myriad sub-blocks of itself. Realism, as an overarching term meant to encompass all the blocks and sub-blocks, is a style of thinking that bases itself primarily on the concept of power; power as is divided into three key distinctions: 1) Statism, 2) Survival, 3) Self-Help (Dunne). Statism meaning that states themselves are the only actors of relevance and states are defined by sovereignty. Survival meaning that the continuation of the state as a sovereign power is the fundamental end towards which all means are aimed. Self-Help meaning that states must rely on themselves to provide their own security. Security, from a realist perspective, is primarily defined in terms of military capacity. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz are popularly seen as the most influential proponents of classical realism and neorealism, respectively. “Morgenthau and Waltz both see the international arena as a competitive and hostile stage where power is the main currency. That is why the concept of power is at the heart of their analysis of international politics” (Pashakhanlou). Pashakhanlou also identifies several key differentiations between classical realism and neorealism. Two, of which I find pertinent to my use of the term, are: 1) Classical realists believe that the root of the realist power struggle can be traced back to the imperfect nature of human beings, while neorealists believe it traces back to the anarchical structure of the international system. 2) Classical realism differentiates between status-quo powers and revisionist powers, what is to say those states who wield their power primarily to maintain themselves and those states who wield their power in an effort to alter, or revise, the structure of the system itself; meanwhile neorealists believe that a state is a state and there is no point to contrast how and why it wields the powers it does. Further along in this paper, in the section entitled ‘Competitive Thought’, I will take a moment to discuss why I believe that neorealism is the way in which we should be thinking about this issue.

King of the Hill

    The Cold War was a dark time in international history, with tensions taut as the world’s inhabitants could only guess at how much time they may have left before nuclear winter descended upon them. In ‘89-’91 these tensions would relax, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the implicated dismantling of its Communist Empire. However, it seems that the tensions’ tautness, for the American government, did not ease. They were now concerned with the reemergence of some power or another which would contest their apparently decided hegemony. On March 8, 1992, a document called Defense Planning Guidance was leaked by a top U.S. official to the New York Times. This document shows stringent concern with the return to power of Russia and its allies, stating:

American strategic nuclear weapons will continue to target vital aspects of the former Soviet military establishment. The rationale for the continuation of this targeting policy is that the United States "must continue to hold at risk those assets and capabilities that current -- and future -- Russian leaders or other nuclear adversaries value most" because Russia will remain "the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States” (Tyler)

The Americans were clearly not satisfied with Russia’s surrender to the capitalist ideal. In fact the document goes on to state that American policies "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role" (Tyler). So America did not feel comfortable with countries ‘even aspiring’ to play larger roles than they already played. There seems to be little room for other kids at all in the post-Cold War American sandbox. This seems like an extremely oppressive mandate to enact, it brings up the question of exactly how they intended to enforce such a policy?

Big Kid on the Block

    America has just come into uncontested supremacy in the global system, and is now seeking not only to fortify its claim to power, but also to snuff out any potential future threats to their decisive hegemony. But just how can they do this, in a war-weary world striving towards peace, without looking like they are stirring up the pot unnecessarily? Well the easiest way to do so was to incite the public aggression, to take the war-weariness of the American population and turn it into a bloodthirst. By creating a pretext, upon which to rest the public opinion, they could more easily gain the public support they needed for an ongoing campaign. It is important to note that the use of pretexts was going on before the end of the Cold War, such as the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Incident, which would pretext the invasion of Vietnam (Johnson) . In fact the Cold War itself was largely based on pretext considering “Harry S.Truman was encouraged to [‘]scare the hell out of the American people,[‘] since this was felt to be the only way to elicit their support for conflict with the Soviets” (Gibbs). Americans would use similar tactics to achieve their politico-military goals up through the turn of the millennium: Iraq in 1998, Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Haiti in 2004 (Cordesman1). But in a world striving towards peace and resolution such tactics could not work forever, and so after exhausting the ‘old tact’, American foreign policy makers came up with a ‘new tact’, although there was not much new about it, it was simply the same old tact but this time it had an extra layer of dirt and deception on top of its already decrepit face.

Color Me Crooked

    At the turn of the millennium the world would begin to see what has come to be known as the ‘Color Revolutions’. Some examples of these are: the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia, the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. These ‘color revolutions’ can be defined as “various political upheavals [which] happened following allegations of electoral fraud in national elections [of post-Soviet regimes] since 2000 [which] seem to indicate democratic breakthroughs” (Thien). Color revolutions have been extremely troublesome, however, considering they cause general instability in large regions, they encourage further instability in neighbouring regions, and they have been breeding grounds for terrorists, such as in Libya. John Breuilly supports this claim in telling us that “the [Western dominated] system preferred dysfunctional states”. Russian military leaders feel that the color revolutions and all their inherent consequences are a direct result of the West, and in particular the US hegemon, attempting to unilaterally impose their culture and ideology onto others throughout the world, and that this imposition, more often than not, fosters radical Nationalist attitudes (Cordesman1). So how does the US do this precisely? How do they impose their culture and ideology onto others throughout the world? It was previously mentioned that the US had developed a newer, dirtier strategy for achieving their politico-military goals. That strategy is a three-step plan as described by senior Russian military officials and summarized by Cordesman1. First incite a revolution, or what has come to be known as a color revolution. Second, if the revolution meets resistance from the government, then apply a ‘concealed use of force’ such as supplying the revolutionaries with arms, training their soldiers, or even hiring out private military companies to go in and lend combative support. Thirdly, if the revolutionaries continue to meet government resistance, then search for a pretext to feed the public and put the US military on the ground. Neorealists agree that one of the main sources of global international instability are bids for global hegemony and unipolarity; Emmanuel Guerisoli throws his hat in this ring, and in doing so points also to Bull 2012, Gilpin 1983, Mearsheimer 2001, Walt 2005, and Waltz 2010.

   

The Russian Responsibility

    Before ‘89-’91, and the end of the Cold War, the Russians (Soviets then) were one of two major hegemonic powers in a bipolar world. And if we go even further back into the age of imperialistic conquest, Czarist Russia was yet a dominating force, albeit one of many. The way this information can be viewed is as a sporting game, that is to say that we (the world) started out with a great deal of hegemonic potential. Then after many decades of competition the weakest potential hegemons were beat out by their stronger opponents, and those who were left competing moved up a bracket. Eventually we came to the semi-finals and we witnessed the great battle (the ‘finals’) for the leading world hegemon, otherwise known as the Cold War. The United States was crowned World Champion those days in ‘89-’91 and we have been moving forward ever since. But I believe that as time went on and America continued along as the uncontested World Champion of hegemonic sport, that the power began to go its head. The photographs of an intoxicated America hanging out in a dingy part of the city, with friends of a questionable nature and background, have begun to pop up in the fourth estate. The world has begun to see America as more than just the decisively-infallible victor from some decades-old competition, but rather as a real State, with real-State problems, real-State concerns, and real-State shortcomings.

Russia in particular has begun to view America in this way, and as such has discovered an opportune moment to make its long awaited comeback in the hearts and minds of the world. After all, Russia was the silver medalist from the Cold War and that clearly gives it a degree of power and authority. A degree of power and authority which has been futile to attempt to exert for a long time, simply due to the aggregate infatuation of the world with the American munificence. Still so, does much of the world stand in awe of its American master, but a time comes along when that no longer matters, and that time is now. With the ongoing incitations of color revolutions throughout the developing world America has begun to destabilize the entirety of social, economic, and political order upon which this globe has come to depend. Through the incessant proliferation of politically-unstable hotspots throughout the world America has come to breed terrorists and terrorism in droves throughout their awe-ful wake (Cordesman2). It is no longer reasonable, for those who can do something about it, to not. No longer can idle players stand-by and watch as the world is destroyed around them. No longer is it permissible, either ethically or morally, for those with power to not wield it with responsibility; for it is precisely such responsibility which is the defining point of the authority of power (Parker). Should someone not step in and assert themselves before this onslaught of subversive democratization, what has become a staple of the American reign of power, then surely the world will ceaselessly tumble towards some undefined precipice of no return. Perhaps such a precipice could be a unified democratic world in which all states are at peace with one another and too busy foddering their economies and human happiness indices to actually care about whether their neighbouring state is Christian, Muslim, Pagan, or Atheist; White, Black, Brown, or Red; Heterosexual, Transexual, Homosexual, or Asexual. But this utopia is not a scenario which the current evidence of the situation seems to suggest. Rather, when looking at what is happening in the wake of the color revolutions: what is observed is instability, chaos, and a deepened sense of hatred and xenophobia. If we should we take this picture, the actuality of reality in the here and now, and project that into the future then the resulting image of politically upturned, hate-centric, ultra-ethno-national states seems to suggest a Hobbesian dystopia in which life becomes “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes). I am not suggesting, necessarily, that should America continue on its trajectory without a check on power that the world as we know it is destined to become some Hell-on-Earth ethno-blood feud of state interactions. I simply seek to clearly define the line, between ethical and unethical endgames, so that there is a poignant understanding of the affairs at hand. And again, I do not intend to imply that by inciting color revolutions throughout the world that America is intentionally striving for chaos, but rather I seek to point out that their reckless fragility (remember that they seek to democratize in fear that some power will rise up to challenge their authority) is very likely to have rather vicious consequences down the line. Russia now has begun to assert itself more prominently in the world theater, perhaps as a means of saying ‘Hey America, settle down please, the Cold War is over’.

Competitive Thought

    Is there any other way to look at this problem? I have spent the last number of pages taking quite a dig at American foreign policy from a neorealist perspective and have managed to draw quite a vivid picture of the American intention and character. However, it would be irresponsible of me to claim that this is the way that things are and if you have another opinion then you are foolish. There are, in fact, many other ways of looking at the problem of the Russian-US Syrian proxy war, and many other ways of looking at the color revolutions of the last 15 or so years. Not only are there alternative views, but they are actually quite strong views. I possess neither the time, nor space herein, to address all the various alternative perspectives but I would like to take a short half paragraph to at least tip my hat to the myriad opponents. Liberalists would be likely to argue that Russia and US are simply doing what it appears they are doing on the surface, that is: helping people with whom their belief systems align. Liberalists will likely bring up the point, in response to the color revolutions, that the people of these countries are making free decisions to rebel against the authoritarian regimes in place above them, and that it is specifically the oppression of these regimes which incited the people to revolt. Social Constructivists may argue that the color revolutions are a result of the portrayal of the happiness, freedom, and luxurious lifestyles of the West in popular media and thus that the people of these countries are striving towards achieving a similar collective ideal for themselves. As for the proxy war I think that a Constructivist might point back to the Cold War and say that it has not yet been long enough for the social construction of fraught bipolar tensions to be replaced by something more progressive, and therefore that Russia is in Syria to ‘oppose the Capitalists’ just as much as the US is in Syria to ‘oppose the Communists’. Post-Colonialists, I believe, would indicate that the color revolutions are a result of colonial subordinates final breaking free from the reigns of their masters, and likewise that the proxy war is simply two colonial masters attempting to maintain control and authority in the system. Now these are just three of many, many viewpoints on the situation; why should we understand this problem from a neorealist perspective, rather than any of the others? I am of the firm opinion that power corrupts, it is so very improbable to maintain power for any extended period of time without developing a thirst for more; more power, more authority, and more recognition. Another thing which I believe to corrupt is ultimacy. That is to say that when one is not checked and balanced by some greater authority than itself, this tends to lead to discrepancies in the ethics by which it asserts its own dominance. I commented previously on the long-standing history and authority of the Russian Empire. The US does not have quite such a long standing history to be able to show the same thing of it; but the US has had now nearly 30 years of uncontested ultimacy, and it is this which corrupts it as a state. What I am saying is that Russia and the US are capital ‘P’ Power Players, and that whenever and wherever Power Players are acting, such situations must be viewed in the context of power itself. Neorealists believe that security is provided by the structure of the international system; by this reasoning it follows that insecurity also flows from the structure international system.

In this paper I have done my best to point out that the international system is becoming progressively more unstable with each advancement of US foreign policy. That is why I believe neorealism to be the correct lens with which to view the Russia-US proxy war in Syria, and also the US incitement of color revolutions, because the US assertion of power has led to an instability in the international system which has now resulted in instability and, resultantly, another state has stepped in to ‘ease the waters’, as it were. Guerisoli lends further support to my suppositions by telling us that the situation “has to be seen through a neorealist prism that prioritizes balance of power between nations and considers any non-inevitable loss of spheres of influence as a direct attack on national interests”. Guerisoli also suggests three primary reasons for Russia’s involvement in Syria, two of which are: counterbalancing US hegemony, and preventing the emergence of stateless zones of destabilization.

Conclusion

    So we have been discussing a couple of things by this point: that Russia is proxy warring the US in Syria as a means of pushing back against the slightly narcissistic hegemony of the US, and we have also dug quite deep into the idea of what America is/has been doing, why they are doing it, and what exactly the issue is with their continuance of such tactics. We touched on the Cold War, the ensuing US concerns regarding the re-rise of Soviet Russia and the terrifying implications which that may have to their own authority. We also spelunked into the murky caverns of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and how those policies were primarily concerned with the belief that Russia would rise again. We were also able to check in on the Russian viewpoint of the American invasions of, and support towards, underdeveloped countries as they experience political turmoil. So I hope that it is plain to see that, although this is not the only way of viewing things, it is in fact a warranted argument that the US has been unilaterally destabilizing the non-West world in an attempt to, not only cause chaos and confusion in the would-be/could-be allies of Communism but also to sway civic opinion, within these states, in US favour as a means of creating a network of support for the American hegemon throughout the world, and also as proxy buffer states to ‘Soviet’ (Russian) expansion. Also it should be concisely understood by this point that Russian expansion is of concern to the US because they do not want to share the power of global hegemony with any others, and Russia is seen as the one state with any true potential to contest American domination. Following the appearance of this global bully (America), it was only a matter of time before some underdog or another stepped up to push back against them, and it is fitting that this underdog is Russia because of its once prominent position in the international system. In fact it is extremely ironic that it should be Russia to push back against the US, considering that it has been America's concern over Russia’s potential to be a competitor that led to the American behaviour which resulted in Russia stepping up and speaking out.

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